CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROBABLE CAUSE
PREREQUISITE TO AN EXTRADITION ARREST

IN Kirkland v. Preston1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit announced that an extradition affidavit
under section 1 of the Fugitives From Justice Act2 will not succeed in
charging a crime unless it alleges facts sufficient to satisfy the fourth
amendment probable cause requirement for arrest. Pursuant to its
request for the extradition of appellants Kirkland and Smith, Florida
submitted to the District of Columbia an arrest warrant, the required
sworn affidavit putatively charging a crime, and a certificate of authenticity initialled by its Governor. The affidavit essentially set
out Florida's second degree arson statute, and included in appropriate places appellants' names and the date and location of the alleged
misconduct. At the extradition hearing, appellants argued that the
affidavit upon which the arrest warrant was based failed to state
probable cause for arrest; but the presiding officer refused to examine
the issue, concluding that appellants were substantially charged and
should be turned over to Florida for trial.3 Appellants' petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court. 4 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
ordered the writ unless Florida supplied a fourth amendment probable cause basis for arrest within two weeks-which it did not do.5
The procedure for effecting interstate rendition of accused
criminals, broadly delineated in the Constitution, was particularized
by Congress in 1793. 7 The current provision, essentially a codification of its 1793 forerunner, provides that in order to effect interstate
extradition, the executive authority of a demanding state should
certify and send to the executive of the asylum state either an indictment found or an affidavit sworn before a magistrate, charging the
- 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
218 U.S.C. § 3182 (1964).

3 385 F.2d at 673. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-401 (a) (1961)
trict court appointed as extradition "executive").

(Chief Judge of dis-

385 F.2d at 673.
I1d.
SU.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2.
7 Act of February 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302; see Kentucky v. Dennison, 65

U.S. (24 How.) 66, 104 (1860).
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alleged fugitive with a crime." Among the objectives of the constitutional and federal statutory guidelines for extradition is facilitation of the safe and prompt return of accused persons to the state
where they are criminally charged. 9 Responding to this purpose,
the judiciary has generally upheld state legislation which allows
extradition upon less exacting terms than those set forth by the
federal statute. 0 Legislation demanding that certain state conditions be met in addition to the federal requirements has not, however, been sanctioned." Nonetheless, comity among the states is not
the sole basis for the constitutional and federal statutory extradition
provisions. A countervailing purpose-protection of the individual
against spurious and indiscriminate charges-is also fundamental to
the extradition scheme. 12 Thus an accused has been guaranteed
the right to test the validity of his extradition arrest and the substantiality of the charge against him by application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the courts of the asylum state.' 3
The tension between the divergent underlying policies has led
courts along two sometimes separate and conflicting paths in their
review of extradition proceedings through habeas corpus petitions.
Fugitives From Justice Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1964).
'E.g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1952); Biddinger v. Comm'r, 245
U.S. 128, 132-33 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906); Ex
parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd sub noma. Morgan v. Horrall,
175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949); Dudley v. Corbett, 46 Misc. 2d
205, 208, 259 N.Y.S.2d 572, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
10
E.g., Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1948), affd sub noma. Morgan v.
Horrall, 175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949) (extradition allowed
although accused not in demanding state when crime committed); Gulley v. Apple,
213 Ark. 350, 210 S.V.2d 514 (1948) (out-of-state parolees required to waive any right
to extradition proceedings); In re Davis, 68 Cal. App. 2d 798, 158 P.2d 36 (1945)
(extradition based on an information allowed); People ex tel. Matochik v. Baker, 306
N.Y. 32, 114 N.E.2d 194 (1953) (same); Ex parte Peairs, 162 Tex. Crim. 243, 283
S.W.2d 755 (1955) (same).
1
E.g., Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627 (1949) (statute required a
copy of any warrant issued before extradition); People ex tel. Cart v. Murray, 357 Ill.
326, 192 N.E. 198 (1934) (evidence of good faith by demanding state required); In re
Sanders, 31 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio App. 1937) (a statement of the reputation of the accused
required).
22 See, e.g., Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950); United States ex tel. McCline v. Meyering,
75 F.2d 716, 717 (7th Cir. 1934); Henry v. McArthur, 122 Colo. 474, 479, 223 P.2d 621,
623 (1950). See also J.B. MooRE, EXTRADITION § 532, at 842 (1891). See generally Comment, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74 YALE L.J. 78 (1964); Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1098,
1104-05 nn.30 & 31 (1964).
28 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 419-22 (1933); Roberts v. Reilly,
116 U.S. 80, 95 (1885); cf. Smith v. Idaho, 373 F.2d 149, 156 (9th Cir. 1967) (new
conflicting evidence not sufficient basis for release in such proceeding).
S
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Prompted by comity, many jurisdictions presume the propriety of
the demanding state's request, 14 and indicate that the accused bears
the burden of proving that he is not a fugitive or is improperly
charged with a crime. 15 In other jurisdictions the sufficiency of the
charging instrument, particularly an affidavit, 16 has not been so
readily accepted; and these courts, placing a greater emphasis on
safeguarding the interests of the alleged fugitive, have subjected
affidavits to closer scrutiny.'1 Even before the Supreme Court ruled
that the federal view of probable cause prescribed by the fourth
amendment is applicable to state arrests,' 8 some jurisdictions required
demanding affidavits to show probable cause for extradition arrests, 0
though precise federal standards were not always employed. Now,
as the Kirkland court noted, the fourth amendment standard is the
20
"minimal and uniform requirement of a valid arrest."
In Kirkland the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed that the
apprehension of an accused by an asylum state for extradition is
clearly a criminal arrest, and that the extradition clause of the
Constitution does not conflict with any guaranteed constitutional
rights. In light of these observations, the court reasoned that the
fourth amendment probable cause requirement should apply equally
to all arrests including those made to facilitate extradition.2 1 The
court also recognized that the disadvantage endured by an individual
extradited to another state without probable cause was particularly
significant in light of the slight burden placed upon a demanding
state required to include sufficient facts in its extradition affidavit to
provide justification for arrest. 22 The Kirkland court concluded
1,See, e.g., United States ex reL Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1967);
In re Tucker, 384 P.2d 413, 416 (Okla. Crim. 1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Raucci v.
Price, 409 Pa. 90, 100-01, 185 A.2d 523, 528 (1962).
'r See, e.g., United States ex reL Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1967);
In re Tucker, 384 P.2d 413, 416 (Okla. Crim. 1963).
16E.g., Henry v. McArthur, 122 Colo. 474, 479, 223 P.2d 621, 624 (1950) (affidavit

alleging probable cause must be more exacting than indictment); People ex rel. de
Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N.Y. 417, 419, 153 N.E. 853, 854 (1926) (same).
1T E.g., United States ex reL McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934);
Raftery ex rel Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1932); Henry v. McArthur, 122
Colo. 474, 223 P.2d 621 (1950); People ex rel. de Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N.Y. 417,
153 N.E. 853 (1926).
28 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
19E.g., United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934);
Raftery ex rel. Huie Fong v Bligh, 55 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1932).
20385 F.2d at 674.

21Id. at 676.
22Id.at 676-77.
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that Florida's affidavit plainly lacked the requisite basis, since the
affidavit failed to identify the sources of its information and was
framed in conclusory terms, mirroring the wording of the Florida
criminal statute allegedly violated by the accused.
Kirkland ignores neither of the dual policies underlying interstate rendition.2 3 By demanding that an affidavit set forth facts
sufficient to satisfy fourth amendment requirements, the District of
Columbia Circuit has assured protection of the due process interests
of persons demanded for extradition. On the other hand, since
Florida, as demanding state, was given an opportunity to correct its
defective affidavit and gain custody of the alleged fugitive, 24 there is a
tacit recognition of comity that should not be overlooked by courts
purporting to follow Kirkland. Another widely recognized manifestation of the comity basis for extradition-the presumption of
the validity of the charging instrument sent by a demanding state25is not aborted by Kirkland's imposition of fourth amendment standards. While this supposition should not exempt an asylum state
from constitutional requirements, in a closer case than Kirkland,
where the facts supplied by the demanding affidavit did not obviously
fall short of fourth amendment probable cause, this presumption
could tip the scales toward acceptance of the sufficiency of the cause
for the extradition arrest.
23 See notes 9, 12 supra and accompanying text.
"&See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
-' See note 14 supra and accompanying text.

